Last week, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government finalized its ministerial statement and submitted it to parliament for a vote of confidence scheduled for February 25 and 26. While the ministerial statement is a constitutional requirement meant to outline the government’s vision and policy priorities, it has historically been little more than a formulaic exercise in political maneuvering rather than a tool for governance. Governments rarely treat it as a binding program, and once they secure parliamentary approval, the document is conveniently set aside.

This time, however, things could have been different. Unlike its predecessors, this government is not a direct product of Lebanon’s entrenched ruling class. Neither the president nor the prime minister hails from the traditional power centers that bankrupted the country and obstructed reforms. They rose to power despite opposition from ruling political parties and managed to form a 24-member cabinet where half the ministers are their own nominees, no faction holds a veto-blocking third, all but three are first-time ministers, and one-third have professional or consultant backgrounds. This presented a unique opportunity—one to use the ministerial statement as a real policy blueprint, breaking free from the political constraints that have suffocated past governments.

Instead, the result is a document that plays it safe, pleases everyone, and commits to nothing. Aside from the issue of security and arms control, it takes no firm stance on Lebanon’s most pressing issues and ultimately serves more as a diplomatic signal to international actors, particularly regarding Resolution 1701, than as a plan for national recovery.

Security Dominates While Socioeconomic Collapse Remains an Afterthought

Perhaps the most telling feature of this ministerial statement is its disproportionate focus on security and geopolitics at the expense of economic and social issues. Nearly half of the statement—3.3 out of its seven pages—is dedicated to security-related matters, a stark contrast given the scale of Lebanon’s domestic collapse.

Granted, this comes in the aftermath of a devastating war, one that has left Hezbollah politically and militarily strained and Lebanon in a precarious geopolitical position. The government’s emphasis on stability, deterrence, and compliance with UNSC Resolution 1701 is unsurprising. Unlike previous administrations, this one rhetorically places the state at the center of security affairs, emphasizing its role in protecting national borders and maintaining civil peace. This marks at least a rhetorical departure from past statements that danced more delicately around sovereignty. However, while the statement projects Lebanon’s security commitments to the international community, it largely neglects the internal crises pushing the country to the brink. 

Lebanon remains in the grip of an unprecedented economic depression, with collapsed state institutions, a failing banking sector, and widespread poverty—yet the statement offers no clear vision for addressing these existential challenges. It provides no direction on what kind of economy Lebanon should strive for and avoids taking a stand on the country’s most contentious financial question: who should bear the burden of the collapse—depositors, banks, or the state? It promises reform but refrains from naming those responsible for the financial meltdown, sidestepping the accountability Lebanese citizens have been demanding.

An Exercise in Political Messaging, Not Governance

Beyond its lack of substance, the ministerial statement is carefully worded to be non-disruptive—designed more as a diplomatic document than a governing manifesto. It does not challenge the entrenched power structures that have crippled Lebanon, nor does it offer a bold new direction. Instead, it tries to appease every faction, satisfy international stakeholders, and avoid stirring political tensions.

On security, it deliberately hedges. The statement asserts that the state alone should control decisions of war and peace, yet it simultaneously affirms “Lebanon’s” right to self defense, effectively preserving ambiguity over Hezbollah’s military role. This balancing act seeks to appease international actors demanding state sovereignty while not alienating domestic political forces that insist on Hezbollah’s parallel military status.

On economic recovery, the statement repeats vague promises about reform, banking sector restructuring, and deposit protection without outlining a concrete plan. It acknowledges Lebanon’s negotiations with the IMF but fails to clarify how the government will reconcile necessary reforms with the demands of powerful banking and political elites who stand to lose from any restructuring efforts.

On social policy, it sidesteps structural solutions. While the statement makes general commitments to improving healthcare, education, and social protection, it does not integrate key national policies like the National Social Protection Strategy, which could serve as a framework for real action. The absence of such policies suggests these issues remain secondary concerns—mentioned for appearances rather than prioritized for meaningful reform.

A Statement That Reinforces Stagnation

For a government lacking traditional partisan backing, this ministerial statement was an opportunity to present a new political imaginary — that could rally broad public support and challenge Lebanon’s entrenched power dynamics. It could have served as a first step toward meaningful change, setting a benchmark for future governments.

Instead, it falls back on the same tired political formulas. It avoids conflict, makes vague commitments with no measurable set of actions, and ultimately mirrors the empty rhetoric of past governments. This was not a ministerial statement designed to drive Lebanon forward; it was a document carefully engineered for survival—to keep all factions satisfied, secure international goodwill, and avoid provoking the forces that have long resisted reform.

Not Just a Missed Opportunity—A Step in the Wrong Direction

In a previous analysis, we outlined what this government should do if it were serious about seizing this rare opportunity for reform. Given the political constraints and the dominance of entrenched elites, we argued that the government should bypass traditional legislative bottlenecks and instead focus on three key areas: developing a strategic vision for Lebanon’s future, fostering a culture of transparency and public participation, and rebuilding state institutions from the ground up.

Instead, it is doing the exact opposite. Rather than developing a strategic vision for Lebanon’s economic and political future in light of shifting regional dynamics, the government offers no long-term direction, no national debate, and no roadmap for transitioning away from its failed economic model. Rather than engaging with the public and civil society in an open, participatory way, it remains locked in a top-down, opaque decision-making process—avoiding real accountability and ignoring opportunities to mobilize broad public support for reform.

Had the government taken even incremental steps in these directions, it could have planted seeds for deeper transformation. Instead, it reinforces the very dynamics that have stalled Lebanon for decades—ambiguous statements, vague promises, and political balancing acts that protect the status quo rather than disrupt it.

Lebanon needed more than another ministerial statement filled with diplomatic hedging and security jargon. It needed vision. It needed a plan. It needed a decisive break from political paralysis. Instead, it got a document engineered to maintain the status quo.