Lebanon’s political class has long perfected the art of creating the illusion of reform while preserving the corrupt system that led the country to collapse. The latest manifestation of this deceptive narrative has resurfaced during recent government formation efforts. Politicians and pundits have circulated three so-called “criteria” for reforms: first excluding Hezbollah from government to facilitate progress, second rotating the Ministry of Finance away from the Amal–Hezbollah alliance, and finally nominating technocrats rather than politicians, under the assumption that they can and will serve the public interest.

These claims are not only misleading, but they are either politically motivated distractions or attempts to gain power at the expense of other ruling parties. For instance, excluding Hezbollah from government does not address the root causes of Lebanon’s crisis. The country’s governance failures stem from decades of mismanagement by the entire ruling elite, not just one party. Singling out Hezbollah conveniently scapegoats it while allowing other entrenched political forces to evade accountability and obstruct reform.

Similarly, the core issue is not which faction holds a particular ministry but how Lebanon’s entire political system operates. Ministerial rotation, in principle, is not a bad idea—no party should have a permanent grip on any ministry. However, in Lebanon’s broken institutions, rotation becomes little more than reshuffling the same corrupt system and ensuring ministries remain tools of political patronage rather than functioning state institutions.

Finally, the notion that technocrats or experts alone will solve Lebanon’s crisis is an illusion. Without meaningful political change, technocrats—assuming they serve public rather than narrow partisan interests—are either powerless or co-opted by the same corrupt system. Appointing them without addressing deeper structural issues simply preserves the status quo under a cosmetic veneer of reform.

Lebanon’s crisis is not about which faction controls a ministry, who participates in government, or whether technocrats are at the helm. It is about a political class entrenched in power, systematically plundering state resources, and sabotaging any genuine attempts at reform. Unless Lebanon tackles the root causes of corruption and misgovernance, these narratives do nothing but deflect blame and maintain the status quo

The Hezbollah Distraction

Calls to exclude Hezbollah from government are often framed as a prerequisite for reform. In reality, however, this is a politically motivated maneuver that serves multiple interests—including Hezbollah’s own. The dominant narrative suggests that Hezbollah is the primary obstacle to reform, implying that removing it from government would resolve Lebanon’s crisis. This is a convenient fiction that benefits both Hezbollah’s opponents and Hezbollah itself.

Western and regional actors, particularly the United States and Saudi Arabia, have long sought to curb Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon. Domestically, Hezbollah’s rivals view government representation as a key battleground for controlling state resources and securing international legitimacy. By portraying Hezbollah as the main roadblock, Lebanon’s ruling elite deflects attention from its own deep-seated corruption while rallying international and sectarian support for its factions.

At the same time, Hezbollah benefits from this narrative by presenting itself as the target of an orchestrated political attack. This portrayal energizes its constituency by casting the party as a victim of foreign intervention and domestic betrayal, thereby deflecting criticism of its own role in Lebanon’s collapse. Like other factions, Hezbollah has actively participated in and enabled the corrupt system it claims to oppose—using state institutions for patronage, protecting allies from accountability, and resisting reforms that threaten its political and financial interests.

This narrow focus on Hezbollah also ignores the broader reality: all major political forces in Lebanon have systematically obstructed reform for decades. When the IMF called for restructuring Lebanon’s banking sector, every major party, including Hezbollah and its allies, blocked meaningful change. The crisis is not about the presence or absence of one party in government; it is about an entire political class—Hezbollah included—that governs through corruption, patronage, and self-interest.

Removing one party from government will not bring reform, just as keeping a party in government does not guarantee resistance against foreign interference. Hezbollah’s opponents employ this narrative to conceal their own complicity in Lebanon’s collapse, while Hezbollah capitalizes on it to strengthen its base. In the end, both sides benefit, and ordinary Lebanese citizens continue to suffer under a system that remains fundamentally unchanged.

The Illusion of Rotation

Ministerial rotation has been touted as a mechanism to break entrenched political control over state institutions, with advocates arguing it disrupts patronage networks and fosters reform. In theory, no party should hold a ministry indefinitely. However, within Lebanon’s deeply politicized system, rotation is not the solution its proponents claim. Instead of promoting reform, it often reinforces the very entrenchment it purports to dismantle.

A 2021 study by Mounir Mahmalat and Sami Zoughaib¹ shows that ministerial rotation actually weakens legislative productivity, resulting in a 24% decline in legislative output. Interviews in the study reveal a predictable yet destructive pattern with each transition. Rather than a smooth handover, ministries are effectively sabotaged: key financial records, project documents, and contracts vanish; bureaucrats obstruct incoming leadership; and administrative chaos ensues. Outgoing ministers and their networks ensure successors inherit little or nothing, making it nearly impossible to implement long-term policies.

Institutional memory erodes further with the departure of consultants and advisers—individuals who possess critical expertise yet are tied to the outgoing minister’s political faction. When they leave, they take with them detailed knowledge of ongoing projects, financial negotiations, and international agreements, leaving incoming ministers with no foundation to build upon.

Far from depoliticizing governance, rotation deepens sectarian control. Ministries function like political fiefdoms, and each new minister is expected to purge staff loyal to the predecessor and install a new network of political appointees. While advocates claim rotation weakens monopolies, in reality, it merely shifts power among factions while preserving a dysfunctional system.

The study also finds that the longer a party has controlled a ministry, the greater the institutional damage upon rotation. Deeply entrenched networks actively obstruct incoming ministers by withholding information, delaying projects, and even removing key personnel who hold institutional knowledge. Rather than fostering reform, rotation generates instability, resets dysfunction, and ensures ministries remain instruments of patronage rather than vehicles of governance.

The Technocrat Illusion: Why Expertise and Neutrality Will not Fix a Broken System

The idea that Lebanon’s crisis can be resolved by appointing technocrats or independent experts to run ministries—even if offered with good intentions—is rooted in flawed assumptions. This narrative hinges on two beliefs: first, that Lebanon’s problems are purely technical rather than political; and second, that technocrats will serve the public interest instead of private or factional agendas. Both are misguided.

Lebanon’s needed reforms—bank restructuring, financial transparency, and institutional accountability—are neither unknown nor overly complex. The ruling elite simply refuses to implement them because doing so would threaten its financial and political interests. The problem is not a lack of technical expertise, but a political system designed to resist reform. Moreover, not all experts are neutral actors serving the public good; many have their own ideological or economic ties, making them as susceptible to influence as traditional politicians.

Even well-intentioned technocrats encounter three insurmountable systemic barriers. First, Lebanon’s bureaucratic apparatus is loyal to sectarian factions, not the state, making effective governance impossible without factional backing. Second, technocrats lack access to the informal consultant networks that control how ministries function and hold institutional knowledge. Third, without political support, technocrats remain vulnerable to obstruction, manipulation, and eventual removal by entrenched power structures that view them as threats.

Time and again, technocrats attempting reforms in Lebanon have been undermined. They are either absorbed into the system—becoming complicit in sustaining the status quo—or sidelined when they refuse to comply. Without dismantling Lebanon’s entrenched power structures, appointing technocrats is nothing more than a cosmetic change that preserves the same corrupt system under different branding.

From Illusion to Reality: Building Institutions

Rotation should happen, but not under the current political and institutional conditions. A functional government cannot be created simply by shuffling ministers while leaving the underlying system intact. For rotation to effect real change, Lebanon needs a governmental framework designed to break political control of ministries, rebuild institutions, and ensure continuity. In other words, the regime must be extracted from the state.

This requires instituting safeguards that prevent ministries from being wiped clean whenever a minister departs. Government records and financial data must be digitized for continuity, and outgoing ministers should be required to provide structured roadmaps detailing ongoing projects, pending decisions, and crucial institutional information. Without these measures, rotation will remain a tool for political manipulation rather than a catalyst for reform.

Depoliticizing Lebanon’s bureaucracies is equally vital. The hiring freeze must be lifted, and recruitment should be based on qualifications rather than sectarian or party quotas. Reform of the Civil Service Board is essential for restructuring public administration so that ministries serve the state, not political factions. As long as bureaucrats remain loyal to parties, ministerial rotation will not improve governance.

Another critical step is regulating the parallel government of consultants, which currently wields disproportionate influence. When ministers rotate, their consultants—who often hold key institutional knowledge—leave with them, causing administrative vacuums. To remedy this, the government must formalize hiring and oversight of consultants to ensure they are not politically appointed power brokers. Limiting the use of externally funded consultants who operate beyond public accountability is also necessary to safeguard ministries from being controlled by private rather than public interests.

Finally, Lebanon must commit to a reform agenda that endures beyond political cycles. Ministerial rotation can only be effective if embedded within a broader, multi-year reform strategy that remains in place regardless of who holds power. This entails binding agreements with international donors and financial institutions that obligate each government to continue agreed-upon reforms. Transparency measures must also enable citizens to track these commitments and hold officials accountable. Absent such structural changes, rotation will persist as a political maneuver that reinforces—rather than dismantles—Lebanon’s entrenched system.