The election of Chief Army Commander Joseph Aoun as President of Lebanon, followed swiftly by the appointment of the President of the International Court of Justice, Nawaf Salam, as Prime Minister, has injected a rare sense of optimism into a country reeling from years of unprecedented social and financial crises, a devastating war with Israel, and prolonged political paralysis. The question now is whether these two leaders, brought to power under complex domestic and regional pressures, can steer Lebanon onto a long-overdue path of reform.

While the new cabinet is entrusted with the dual mandate of enforcing Resolution 1701 and implementing sweeping reforms, this article focuses on the latter. We argue that the path to reform is fraught with obstacles. First, the forces responsible for President Aoun’s election are distinct from those that brought Prime Minister Salam to power. Second, neither set of political drivers will endorse the necessary reforms. Third, the institutional arrangement of governing through the National Pact Accord will impede reforms, regardless of the two leaders’ intentions. Hence, in light of the current government’s limited tenure before the upcoming 2026 parliamentary election, a strategic approach is needed to preserve and leverage whatever political capital it has to create a new political imaginary for Lebanon.

The Calculus of the Election

It took 26 months and 13 parliamentary sessions for Joseph Aoun, then Chief Army Commander, to become president. He was not the first choice of any major political party. Although his name circulated in the media, the Free Patriotic Movement refused him outright, the Lebanese Forces withheld their endorsement until the final moment, and for Hezbollah and Amal he was initially a non-starter. In the first twelve parliamentary sessions—held before the war—he appeared on the ballot only once, receiving a solitary vote among 15 other candidates. Despite these hurdles and ongoing constitutional debates regarding a public servant’s eligibility for the presidency, he was eventually elected in the second round on January 9 with 99 out of 128 votes, under the watch of international and regional actors.

Two overarching geopolitical alignments paved the way for his victory. The first was shaped by the aftermath of the war, which weakened Hezbollah and gave the United States enough leverage to insist on placing an army commander at the helm of implementing the Resolution 1701 ceasefire agreement. The second stemmed from regional shifts, particularly the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the rise of Turkish influence through groups like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which prompted Saudi Arabia to support Joseph Aoun’s candidacy as a way to maintain a strategic foothold in the Levant.

A Surprising Appointment: Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister

While external pressures and regional realignments were critical in facilitating Joseph Aoun’s presidency, Nawaf Salam’s appointment as Prime Minister resulted from a different, largely domestic process. Most ruling parties had publicly supported caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati for another term, in keeping with the earlier power deal. However, intense intra-elite rivalries prompted a sudden shift. Reformist parliamentarians, who opposed both Mikati and his main competitor Fouad Makhzoumi, put forward Nawaf Salam’s name. The Free Patriotic Movement, which had clashed with Mikati throughout his tenure, agreed to back “anyone but Mikati,” and the Lebanese Forces, displeased at being sidelined from the presidency, also broke from the earlier Aoun–Mikati “ticket.” Several other parties, wary of Hezbollah and Amal’s backing for Mikati, found Salam a more acceptable alternative.

Thus, Salam’s appointment had stronger domestic underpinnings than the president’s election. Yet in both cases, the leaders were propelled into power by forces seeking tactical gains, rather than by a robust constituency pushing for genuine political and economic overhaul.

Is Reform Now Possible?

Many Lebanese citizens hope that a new geopolitical climate and renewed domestic alliances might finally enable the reforms the country desperately needs: overhauling the financial sector, strengthening the productive economy, rejuvenating state institutions, and providing robust social welfare. Yet the ruling elites that have sabotaged reforms in the past have not changed course. Furthermore, the state apparatus has been severely weakened and hollowed out by the same ruling elite’s policies, making the implementation of reforms even harder.

Early signs suggest that Prime Minister Salam will aim for a hybrid government of political and technocratic ministers. However, the traditional power-sharing arrangement—nominally based on the National Reconciliation Accord—continues to guide government formation, meaning major sects and parties will still demand their share. Their endorsement remains necessary for the government to secure a vote of confidence. Consequently, the executive branch will likely include many of the same parties that have resisted, stalled, or watered-down crucial reforms in the past.

Some observers claim that reforms will be adopted now that Hezbollah is weakened, implying that Hezbollah alone obstructed progress. Indeed, the party has blocked various reform initiatives and shielded the establishment during the 2019 uprising, the Beirut Port explosion investigation, and on fiscal policies that upheld the status quo. Yet other parties share equal responsibility for thwarting reforms. Numerous initiatives—whether related to the banking sector, investigations into corruption, or state finances—were never fully implemented because the entire ruling elite closed ranks. Most of these parties are complicit in both the country’s financial collapse and the cover-up of the port explosion.

Efforts to restructure the financial system through the Diab government’s Lazard Plan were promptly obstructed by a parliamentary committee representing all ruling parties—including the Free Patriotic Movement, Lebanese Forces, Amal Movement, Hezbollah, Progressive Socialist Party, Azm, and the Independence Movement—leading to skyrocketing poverty, growing inequality, and waves of emigration. The same elite extended Riad Salameh’s tenure as Governor of the Central Bank, despite his role in Lebanon’s disastrous monetary policies, and continues to block the capital control and banking restructuring laws required for the IMF Staff-Level Agreement. Their resistance to reform has even deeper roots. Before the 2019 financial crisis, this political establishment repeatedly committed to reforms at international donor conferences—commonly referred to as Paris I, II, III, and the 2018 CEDRE conference—but rarely delivered on its promises.

In addition to resisting reform, the ruling elite has further weakened the state, making significant changes even more challenging to implement. Public administration is alarmingly understaffed, with as many as 70 percent of permanent positions vacant due to hyperinflation that rendered salaries nearly worthless. Meanwhile, there is heavy reliance on temporary consultants who often operate in parallel structures outside the official bureaucracy and serve the regime’s interests rather than those of the state or society. This setup erodes accountability, undermines institutional memory, and leads to drastic drops in productivity whenever senior officials or ministers change. Because the bureaucracy is largely treated as a subordinate entity rather than a partner in governance, there is little chance for policy continuity or effective implementation.

International actors have historically stepped in to stabilize Lebanon only when their strategic interests demanded it—whether to contain regional spillovers or maintain security arrangements, particularly regarding refugees. They have repeatedly provided grants and loans, as in the Paris and CEDRE conferences, effectively bailing out the political establishment with weak enforcement of reform conditionalities.

What Can the New Administration Do?

In the absence of a government with legislative authority—which historically facilitated breakthroughs under previous reformist administrations the new executive branch must accept that traditional paths to reform, especially those requiring parliamentary approval, will likely remain blocked by the entrenched elite.

Nevertheless, there are still productive ways to use this short window of opportunity to lay the groundwork for deeper transformation in the future. First, the government should develop a strategic vision for Lebanon in light of regional changes, grounded in broad public engagement. Since the collapse of the previous economic model, there has been no meaningful debate on the country’s long-term prospects. While this does not require legislative action, it does demand transparent, inclusive dialogue with local communities, business and labor organizations, civil society groups, think tanks, and the Lebanese diaspora. A clearly articulated, collectively owned vision of the country’s future—politically, economically, and socially—could energize the public even in this uncertain environment, offering a roadmap for current and future governments.

Furthermore, the government can begin establishing a more transparent, participatory culture of governance. By communicating honestly and regularly with citizens, sharing data on budgets and expenditures, and inviting public feedback on key policy decisions, the administration could start rebuilding trust. Involving communities and civil society in monitoring government programs would not only help expose corruption but also give ordinary people a sense of ownership in the country’s recovery.

No matter what vision emerges, the government must also rebuild state institutions. It can begin by addressing non-legislative barriers that have undermined the state apparatus. The public sector urgently needs a rebalancing of wages to retain skilled employees. Rather than perpetuating ad hoc consultant structures, the government could integrate capable consultants into permanent civil service roles. With donor support, the civil service could also rebuild capacity through targeted training programs, hiring initiatives, and the re-engagement of skilled individuals who have left. Though these measures may seem incremental, they are essential to restoring the bureaucracy’s functionality and bridging the gap between policy formulation and execution.

While the prospects for wide-scale reforms remain low given the political constraints, Prime Minister Salam’s government can at least plant seeds for the future. By using political imagination to challenge the entrenched elite’s legitimacy and to build a broader constituency for a new political project, the administration can help shape a more hopeful trajectory for Lebanon—even if the real fruits of reform may only be realized by subsequent governments.