In the predominant, grand geopolitical theorizing about what the fall of the Assad regime means for external actors and the region, Syria and Syrians are strikingly absent. It may be too early to take full stock, but the writing is on the wall. Quite literally, Syrians risk being written out of their own revolution and future. For those reluctant to jump to conclusions so soon, let this serve as both a warning and a call to action. Framing Syria without Syrians is a recipe for further trouble.

The glaring analytical gaps in the initial responses to the astonishing effort that toppled the Assad regime are already evident in how the complex dynamics leading to its collapse are being portrayed. For instance, some argue that Turkey was behind HTS’s offensive, yet what does HTS itself think about its relationship with Turkey? How might it have manipulated Turkey to actively or tacitly support its military campaign in Aleppo and then its march on Damascus? Aside from a handful of pundits, most Western media have failed even to pose the question. Russia is assumed to be too preoccupied with its war in Ukraine to save Assad from the rebels, but again, few ask about HTS’s preparations. Did it anticipate that a limited campaign in Aleppo could pave the way to Damascus? Hezbollah is believed incapacitated by Israel’s relentless bombing. Perhaps so, but for many commentators, the role of Syrians in seizing the moment created by such constraints on external actors scarcely matters.

While most commentary focuses on the demise of the “Axis of Resistance” following Assad’s collapse, we know very little about how HTS, other Syrian political players, and Syrians in general view Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Iraqi militias (Hashd al-Sha’bi). What explanations do Syrians who experienced pro-Iranian and Iraqi militias firsthand offer for their failure to come to the regime’s rescue? Are the atrocities these groups committed in Syria what primarily shape Syrians’ views of future relations? Or do other factors also matter, such as empathy with Palestinians still subjected to genocide in Gaza, or a pragmatic inclination that a new Syria cannot afford to lose itself in enmity with its Arab neighbors and Iran? Of course, all these considerations can be simultaneously relevant. How Syrians reconcile these factors, struggle to do so, or arrive at different conclusions should be headline news.

Regarding the U.S. and Europe, many key issues remain overlooked—issues that directly involve and affect Syrians inside Syria and abroad. While dwelling on HTS’s and Abu Muhammad al-Jolani’s supposed “terrorist” credentials and the alleged threat they pose to the West, mainstream media rarely ask how the U.S. and the EU might assist Syrians emerging from decades of repression and horror under Assad. There are urgent needs that Western support can effectively address: trauma treatment for prisoners released from Sednaya prison; forensic expertise to identify victims found in mass graves and collect evidence for future prosecutions; mine clearance; bolstering humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons and returning Syrians; sending archival experts and techniques to secure documents found in mukhabarat branches that will be crucial for transitional justice. These are just a few examples among many. Yet most pundits lost in convoluted geopolitical analyses have barely touched on them. The silence from Western policymakers is equally deafening. U.S. President Joe Biden appeared content simply to claim credit for Assad’s overthrow, with nothing to say about how the U.S. might help a nation rising from the ashes of one of the most brutal authoritarian regimes the world has seen. His successor, Donald Trump, seemed equally oblivious, insisting that “Syria is a mess” and that “the U.S. should have nothing to do with it.” The EU’s new foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, has offered no indication that the EU is considering post-Assad Syria’s urgent needs. She stuck to generic calls for “calm” and the “protection of all Syrians, including minorities.” After throwing Lebanon under the bus as it faced an Israeli onslaught over the last two months, the EU is not signaling that Syrians will receive better treatment after Assad’s fall.

Furthermore, in Europe, large numbers of Syrian refugees still face the imminent threat of policies aimed at sending them back. Only days before the regime’s fall, several European countries—such as Denmark, Italy, Austria, and the Netherlands—argued that refugees should be returned to so-called “safe areas” inside Syria, for which a restoration of diplomatic relations with Assad was considered inevitable. Now that the horrors of regime repression and mass incarceration are on full display, few ask right-wing politicians and governments in Europe how they ever reached that stance. After all, it should come as no surprise that battered, tortured, and starved Syrians are emerging from the catacombs of Sednaya prison—images that Western media are otherwise keen to broadcast. Yet no major Western media outlet seems to investigate how far European authorities already went in approaching or collaborating with the regime, potentially implicating themselves in its brutality.

Many Syrians who are appealing rejections of their asylum applications are now left in limbo. On one hand, the threat from the regime they fled is said to be gone. On the other hand, returning to an unstable Syria where their homes may be destroyed or occupied is equally inhumane or simply impractical. Again, there is deafening silence in the media and public debate. For now, some European countries have decreed they will no longer process Syrian asylum applications. Others argue that with the regime gone, Syrians should return home immediately. Geert Wilders, a leading Dutch right-wing politician, put it bluntly: “If Syrians are celebrating the new situation in Syria, then they could also be sent back,” implying his own lack of enthusiasm in embracing Assad’s fall. How Syrians are supposed to find safety in a country where the predominant force is a group designated as “terrorist” by Western countries—and considered a threat to Western security—is not explained. Such positions are bafflingly self-serving and completely divorced from Syrians’ dilemmas and hardships. Right-wing politicians impatient to expel Syrians remain blinded by their assumptions about refugees’ supposedly disingenuous motives. They fail to acknowledge that many Syrians, given the opportunity, would prefer to live in Syria, not least because Western media rarely give them a voice. As one exiled Syrian, Amro Ali, put it: “Far-right nationalists in Europe are likely frustrated that Syrians undermined their populist electoral and policy measures aimed at expelling them by voluntarily returning to Syria, and being happy about it.” Few bother asking Syrian refugees how they envision their own future—either in Syria, in their host countries, or both. To treat them as human beings, we should at least pose these questions and become better informed.

Of course, to some extent it is understandable that mainstream Western media, their featured pundits, and Western governments have not immediately and fully grasped all the complex implications of Assad’s unexpected and rapid fall, both in terms of opportunities and challenges. Indeed, it will take time to comprehend these implications, especially for those who had resigned themselves to Assad’s vow to remain in power “forever.” Yet their initial framing of the regime’s collapse—instantly reverting to exhausted narratives of Middle Eastern geopolitical chess and the ever-looming threat of “terrorism”—speaks volumes about how most Western media, pundits, and politicians remain stuck in the lens they adopted after the uprising became a protracted armed conflict: a geopolitical headache devoid of Syrians, except when they appear as terrorists or unwanted refugees. This framing is not just analytically flawed. Arguably, it already influences the knee-jerk Western and Israeli approach to welcoming the end of over half a century of dictatorship and unimaginable brutality: by continuing to rely on bombing.

For a more constructive perspective that recognizes Assad’s fall as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for positive change, we must acknowledge the country’s many difficulties, understand its entanglement in a turbulent region, but —above all—give voice to the Syrians who will work to overcome these challenges.