As Lebanon’s financial and economic crises deepen, the severe shortcomings in the country’s formal social protection system have left the population increasingly abandoned and vulnerable. Capitalizing on this grim reality, the political elites have doubled down on their regime of social privileges, aiding the select at the disadvantage of the rest. They activated informal patronage networks for their loyalists and privileged select civil servants, particularly the military. The large majority of the country that is disenfranchised, those without political significance, are left to suffer. Left behind, more and more people have sought to flee Lebanon through people-smuggling sea routes, a tragic option that has left hundreds dead so far. 

The failure of authorities to respond seriously to the social disaster cannot be justified with the excuses of financial constraints or technical ineptitude. The central bank generously spent from its reserves an amount equivalent to the current size of the economy (~$20 billion) on regressive subsidies, quixotic attempts to prop up the exchange rate, and transfers of capital abroad. The National Social Protection Strategy, a document that details how the country can move beyond the current system of social privileges and onto one of social protection rights, was further delayed by the Mikati government. 

The absence of serious action is due to systemic constraints that were entrenched in Lebanon’s political economy well before the country’s financial and economic meltdown began in 2019. Since the crises erupted, the system of social benefits delivery is on a dangerous trajectory threatening Lebanon’s social fabric. The current approach — which heavily relies on localized interventions from non-state actors and weakens state institutions further — is further consolidating sectarian and regional political arrangements.

Social protection as a basis for unity
The value of social protection programming extends well beyond its proven socio-economic benefits as an investment in human capital. At the fundamental level, social protection is a collective risk-sharing agreement among people that guarantees a basic level of rights and dignity for all. These guarantees are provided as rights through a centralized institutional arrangement, the state, and are funded through taxes or contributions. This arrangement forms the basic social contract that regulates civic relationships among citizens and between them and the state. Social protection is an essential tool in providing a unifying national entity for citizens. 

A state-led, rights-based, and comprehensive social protection system should provide benefits without discrimination or expectation of political loyalty. The centralization of social protection programming under the state — including the types of benefits, their size, and beneficiaries — can reinforce collective and nationwide solidarity. Of course, this centralization on the policy design level can still allow for the benefits of well-structured deconcentrated systems of service delivery and adaptive social protection measures. 

How ruling elites captured social protection 
After the end of the 1975-1990 Civil War, Lebanon’s political elites weakened the social role of the state to distort the social contract and create communitarian fiefdoms guaranteeing their hold on power. 

Elites used state resources and private capital to establish clientelist social protection networks. The country’s sectarian political parties became the main providers of benefits, creating multiple, competing, social contracts and political arrangements.

The ruling politicians also instituted a hierarchy of social benefits delivery, based on the political usefulness of the recipients. The Military Cooperation received generous social security benefits compared to the Cooperation of Civil Servants, both of which in turn were better resourced than the National Social Security Fund that covers formal private sector workers. Disenfranchised informal workers, which make up the largest share of the workforce, are left at the bottom of the hierarchy with no social security benefits and only targeted social assistance programs. 

Elites also co-opted worker unions and syndicates in a bid to stymie labor mobilizations and block attempts at collective bargaining. 

These strategies created a system of social privileges that reversed the unifying characteristic of social protection systems and enfeebled the democratic processes of political representation. 

Post-crisis “localization”
The landscape of social protection in the country after the start of the crises further consolidated the existing system and exacerbated its shortcomings. What existed of the state-led social security system was annihilated as ad-hoc social assistance programs, formal and informal, dominated the response to the worsening situation.

Instead of reforming the system, the state-led social response was limited to a “fiscally reasonable” poverty targeting program. This effort succeeds the absurdly expensive and inefficient subsidization program led by the central bank. Only this year, with its subsidization of the exchange rate through the Sayrafa platform, the central bank incurred a loss worth around three times the value of the adopted poverty targeting program (~US$900 million). Meanwhile, investments in life-cycle inclusive benefits, such as the social protection floor proposal¹ and the failing NSSF, have been minimal. 

The role of state institutions weakened further as international donors favored their own channels of delivery or non-governmental organizations as vehicles of aid delivery. This is due to the perceived bad governance and corruption practices within formal institutions. 

The near total absence of the state on the social level led to a proliferation of informal channels of assistance aiming to cover the gaps. These informal channels are, by and large, community-based and lack a central policy design.

These efforts have been driven by two main mechanisms. The first is through localized interventions from political or religious actors using politically affiliated municipalities, religious institutions, and other organizations affiliated with these actors. The funding of these programs mainly relies on the philanthropy of affluent members of political parties and religious organizations in Lebanon and the country’s diaspora. The second is through localized donor-led interventions implemented by international organizations or by domestic non-state actors. 

While these interventions might have short term palliative effects, they present deep political risks that potentially threaten the country’s social fabric. This “decentralized” structure of social assistance and the absence of a capable central government are further consolidating sectarian and geographical-based political arrangements in Lebanon. The communities within these arrangements are not only divided by socio-economic and political factors, but they are also competing for limited resources from donors and the diaspora leading to rising tensions. 

A protracted crisis in Lebanon within this context could lead to a disintegration of society for generations to come.

A protracted crisis in Lebanon within this context could lead to a disintegration of society for generations to come.

The alternative
Reversing course from this grim reality is still possible. Building a state-led rights-based and inclusive social protection system in Lebanon is both financially and technically feasible. The social protection strategy offers a solid basis for building such a system. Its adoption and implementation, without dilution, is necessary. 

Feasible measures that can help move efforts on the right path include the adoption of a social protection floor that targets life-cycle vulnerabilities and the implementation of urgently needed financial and institutional reforms offered by the World Bank-funded Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) program.

Meanwhile, deconcentrated state institutions, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs’ Social Development Centers, offer a reliable platform for adaptive measures that can cushion the impact of the crisis in partnership with international donors and civil society actors. Revitalizing state institutions and resuscitating the social role of the state would go a long way in rebuilding trust and paving the way for a healthier social contract.