With the withdrawal of the Future Movement and the emergence of contenders with capital, Tripoli’s political elites are reshuffling their positions to guarantee their places in the city’s new political arena. Key figures from former parties, namely the Future Movement, have settled with newcomers, thus reshaping their networks, discourses and alliances. Clientelist networks that work through electoral keys or ‘brokers’ and powerful individuals who secure votes for politicians, are also venturing into some reshuffling. In this round of elections, a few brokers regularly used by establishment politicians are less busy than usual, while a new class of brokers favored by newcomers with capital is being activated, although its effectiveness is yet to be determined. As things stand now, the lists of Mikati and Alloush are reducing the number of their electoral keys, leaving some of their most substantial ones behind.  Rifi is using a hierarchal system by dividing his constituency into sectors led by a small number of electoral keys. By contrast, newcomer Matar is using a high number of small family brokers. There is also fierce competition over electoral keys between Elie Khoury, the LF candidate on Rifi’s list and Suleiman Obeid on Mikati’s list. This points out to the fact that keeping LF out of Tripoli is a key political issue, if not the most important one.  

Limited political mobilization and discourse 
Overall, discourse and policy proposal in this round of elections is very limited. In the elections of 2009 and 2018, candidates connected to the political establishment held campaigning activities, including outreach in large meetings, festivals and other events that contributed to building a popular support base for political elites in visible and affective ways. As coercion tactics, these events turned previous elections into a collective process that led to both mobilization and competition. The upcoming elections are different in that these two elements are not visible on Tripoli’s streets today. The absence of these events is indicative of the lack of political programs and policies developed by candidates, and their reduced interest in reaching out to their constituencies and catering to their needs. Another element missing from the political discourse of most lists is attention to local solutions to Lebanon’s economic and political crises. Candidates are opting for existential rhetoric, in which foreign actors such as Iran and Saudi Arabia take center stage. This boils down political discourse to generalities and ideological opposition. A few exceptions on opposition lists are showing attention to policy in meetings held on grass root levels. 

In conclusion, the mood in Tripoli is that of confusion and demobilization7,  as no popular base is being consolidated prior to the elections. Most opposition lists lack clear political programs, with some of them including figures who were close to political elites. These are consequently unable to attract the anti-establishment vote. At the same time, old political networks have taken a hit in the economic crisis, thereby making room for new faces, which, in the past, would have either been eyed with a greater deal of suspicion, or absorbed into establishment lists. These political scene newcomers are promising change but are building on exploitative tactics left by the old establishment while setting the stage for even more harmful clientelist contracts. Tripoli finds itself marred by a political vacuum that is being temporarily filled with large sums of money, but that will end up deepening frustration and marginalization on the long run.